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On 10 June, MEPs voted to suspend a debate on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). As Robert Basedow writes, one of the criticisms of TTIP that has been raised is
the notion that it could undermine European and American democracy by inhibiting the ability of
governments to regulate in the public interest. He argues that while concerns over the degree of
regulatory cooperation implied by TTIP are understandable, the envisaged provisions are unlikely to
pose a substantial threat to national democracy or the ability of governments to pursue eﬀective
public policy-making.
The negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the United
States have spurred the interest of the general public in trade and investment policy. In particular, the envisaged
investment arbitration and protection provisions of TTIP have proven to be highly controversial. They were the hot
topic of last week’s memorable session of the European Parliament, where MEPs voted to suspend a debate on the
current state of negotiations.
The public debate on TTIP has turned toward a second key issue – transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Critics warn
that the envisaged transatlantic regulatory cooperation would weaken the role of parliaments and strengthen the
inﬂuence of business in standard-setting, regulation and legislation. Regulatory cooperation may thus entail a
‘regulatory chill’ and harm democracy. But why do states engage in regulatory cooperation? How does regulatory
cooperation work in general and under TTIP in particular? And does it indeed threaten our democracies and states’
ability to pursue public policies?
TTIP and international regulatory cooperation
International regulatory cooperation seeks to promote economic growth by liberalising trade in goods and services.
Due to decades of trade negotiations in the GATT/WTO and unilateral liberalisation eﬀorts, traditional trade barriers
such as tariﬀs have been largely dismantled and are of only small signiﬁcance to trade among developed economies
nowadays. Diverging laws, regulations and standards impose much higher costs on companies and economies than
classic tariﬀs.
Laws, regulations and standards may diﬀer across countries for two reasons. In many cases diverging laws,
regulations and standards reﬂect diverging democratic and public policy objectives. Europeans and Americans for
instance follow diﬀerent approaches regarding the market admission of chemical substances. In the EU, chemical
producers must show that their products do not constitute environmental or health risks. In the United States, in
contrast, chemical producers may freely sell their products until scientiﬁc evidence emerges that a product
represents an environmental or health hazard.
In other cases diverging laws, regulations and standards are the unintentional result of uncoordinated regulatory
activity. Regulatory diﬀerences thus reﬂect insuﬃcient communication among regulators. Diﬀerences in the market
admission procedures for pharmaceuticals in the EU and the United States illustrate this point. Pharmaceutical
experts argue that drug safety laws in the EU and the US aim for a similar level of patient safety. EU and US
pharmaceutical regulators, however, prescribe diﬀerent test procedures. Pharmaceutical companies therefore spend
a lot of money to run through the test and market admission procedures in the US and the EU despite the fact that
both systems seek to ensure the same outcome in terms of public health.
1/3
Opposition to TTIP during the vote in the European Parliament on 10 June,
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International regulatory cooperation seeks to tackle the second category of regulatory divergence. It intends to lower
the administrative burden on companies and to
ensure access to cheaper and better goods and
services for consumers. While many believe that
international regulatory cooperation was invented in
the context of the TTIP negotiations, it is an old
phenomenon. One may broadly distinguish between
three types of regulatory cooperation.
First, states frequently cooperate informally and
through soft law. Regulators informally talk to each
other and exchange information. The International
Competition Network is an example of such informal
cooperation. Second, states engage in formal
cooperation through international agreements,
international organisations or cooperation councils.
For instance the EU and the US have signed so-
called Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs)
regarding technical product standards. The member
states of the OECD, moreover, have been cooperating for many decades so as to approximate ﬁscal legislation.
Australia and New Zealand have also established a regulatory cooperation council to systematically exchange
information on legislation, regulation and standards.
Third, states indirectly cooperate through public-private regulatory initiatives. Business associations and non-
governmental organisations have in many sectors become important rule-makers. For example non-state actors
globally deﬁne accounting standards. States and international organisations encourage or – in the words of Abbot et
al. – ‘orchestrate’ such private regulatory initiatives. Many states then transpose transnational private regulation into
binding national rules.
How is regulatory cooperation supposed to work under TTIP? A textual proposal of the relevant chapter released by
the European Commission in February 2015 outlines the envisaged general principles and functioning of
transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Regulatory cooperation shall not interfere with the parties’ right to regulate and
to pursue public policies. The parties, however, commit to respecting international principles of good governance.
Parties should conduct impact assessments for regulatory initiatives; regulation procedures should be transparent;
and stakeholders – understood as civil society, trade unions, environmental advocates, business and alike – should
be allowed to submit their views.
Most European countries, the European Institutions and the United States already follow these principles at the
national level. The TTIP draft, furthermore, foresees the creation of a Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB), which
will be composed of European and US regulators. It shall meet regularly to discuss and exchange information on
planned regulatory initiatives with the aim of avoiding the creation of unnecessary regulatory barriers. Stakeholders
will be allowed to voice their concerns vis-à-vis the RCB.
So do these provisions challenge European and American democracy and the ability of parties on both sides to
pursue public policies? This claims seems overstated. First, the TTIP provisions do not alter the legislative powers of
national parliaments. Second, the bulk of regulation is actually carried out by specialised regulatory agencies, whose
mandates and powers will not be changed under the envisaged TTIP provisions. Third, the planned TTIP provisions
do not allow any party to veto or to legally challenge another party’s regulations on grounds of insuﬃcient
coordination and cooperation. Regulatory cooperation will remain soft law aiming for increasing the awareness of
regulators for the international environment.
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Fourth, American and European regulators already informally cooperate in many domains. The planned
institutionalisation may actually strengthen democracy by increasing accountability and rendering transparent the
role of non-state actors in regulatory cooperation. Fifth, the often voiced claim that business will have privileged
access as well as a veto to block regulation in the RCB cannot be upheld on the basis of available draft texts of TTIP.
What is more, the widespread assumption that business always favours deregulation and will push for a ‘regulatory
chill’ is not accurate. In international contexts, businesses often lobby for maintaining demanding regulations as a
market entry barrier against foreign competitors.
Ultimately, while concerns over regulatory cooperation are understandable, the envisaged TTIP provisions are not
per se a danger to democracy and public policy. It is nevertheless evident that regulators will have to stand their
ground if need be and honour their democratically determined mandates against foreign demands. Civil society and
citizens will have to participate and balance out business lobbying in a future transatlantic RCB – this however is not
much diﬀerent from regulation and legislation at the national level.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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